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In this paper we present a new industry-level database to analyze sources of growth in four major Euro-
pean countries: France, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (EU-4), in comparison with
the United States for the period 1979–2000. Aggregate labor productivity growth is decomposed into
industry-level contributions of labor quality, ICT and non-ICT capital deepening and TFP. A small
set of service industries is mainly responsible for the acceleration in ICT capital deepening in both
regions, but their contribution to growth is lower in the EU-4 than in the U.S. TFP in these ICT-
intensive services accelerated in the U.S. in the 1990s, but not in Europe. In addition, widespread 
deceleration in non-ICT capital deepening in the EU-4 has led to a European labor productivity 
slowdown.
1. I
The late 1990s have seen a major change in the comparative growth perfor-
mance of Europe and the United States. Since the Second World War labor pro-
ductivity growth in Europe had outstripped that of the United States, leading to
rapid catch-up. However, since 1995 U.S. labor productivity growth has nearly
doubled compared to earlier periods, while European growth rates declined.
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Much research based on growth accounting has tried to explain the U.S.
growth surge, as well as why Europe has fallen behind, by focusing on investment
in ICT assets. In the first round of studies aggregate trends in the U.S. were ana-
lyzed. Accelerating labor productivity growth was mainly attributed to increasing
investment in ICT-goods and improvements in TFP (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000;
Oliner and Sichel, 2000). Industry-level TFP trends were still unavailable, but
rough estimates by “backing out” TFP growth in IT production suggested that
most of the aggregate TFP acceleration could be traced back to rapid technolog-
ical change in ICT goods production.1 But as more detailed industry-level data
became available, the focus broadened to include not only ICT-goods producing
industries but also service industries that are heavy users of ICT. Studies by Triplett
and Bosworth (2004) and Jorgenson et al. (2005) show that the biggest contribu-
tors to aggregate ICT capital deepening are a limited number of service industries,
in particular trade, finance and business services. Besides TFP growth in ICT-
goods manufacturing, TFP acceleration in the ICT-using service industries
appears to be important as well.
The first set of growth accounting studies for Europe relied heavily on private
data sources on ICT expenditure collected outside the system of national accounts
(Schreyer, 2000; Daveri, 2002). They found that although ICT-investment growth
also accelerated in Europe, its lagging behind the U.S. was mainly due to lower
levels of ICT investment. This conclusion was confirmed once investment series
from national accounts became available (Colecchia and Schreyer, 2002; van Ark
et al., 2002; Vijselaar and Albers, 2002). Typically, they found that the contribu-
tion of ICT capital deepening to aggregate labor productivity growth in Europe
was only half the contribution in the U.S.
Secondly, the studies unveiled that the European slowdown after the mid-
1990s was not directly related to developments in information and communication
technology. Instead the explanation can be found by trends in more traditional
sources of growth. In contrast to the U.S., contributions from non-ICT capital
deepening declined considerably after 1995 and appeared to be an important deter-
minant of the European labor productivity slowdown (Timmer and van Ark,
2005).
Thirdly, it was found that in contrast to the U.S., aggregate TFP growth in
Europe did not accelerate. This difference could only partly be attributed to the
smaller ICT-producing sector in Europe compared to the U.S. and hence must be
sought elsewhere in the economy (Timmer and van Ark, 2005). A detailed study
of labor productivity growth at the industry level by van Ark et al. (2003) sug-
gested that much of the failure of Europe to achieve its own labor productivity
growth revival in the late 1990s can be traced to the same industries that performed
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1The latter point is stressed especially by Gordon (2000). Triplett and Bosworth (2004) and Jor-
genson et al. (2005) show that this “backing out” of IT-production TFP from aggregate TFP can be
highly misleading as it generates only a net measure of TFP growth outside IT-production. Industry-
level studies show that TFP growth rates outside IT-goods manufacturing have also been high.
However, high growth in some industries was cancelled out by low or negative TFP growth in many
other industries (see Section 5).
so well in the United States, particularly trade and finance. Labor productivity
growth in these intensive ICT-using industries lagged severely in Europe.
However, without detailed information on ICT and non-ICT investment for
individual industries, it remains unclear which industries are responsible for the
gap in ICT investment between Europe and the U.S., the European slowdown in
non-ICT capital deepening and its sluggish TFP growth compared to the U.S. The
main novelty of this study is the incorporation of ICT and non-ICT capital service
flows in a growth accounting decomposition of labor productivity growth at the
industry level for European countries. This is done for twenty-six industries and
four major European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K.)
in comparison with the U.S. for the period from 1979 to 2000. Together these four
countries make up about 70 percent of total GDP in the European Union and are
referred to as EU-4 in the remainder of this paper.
Table 1 provides a decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth into
the contributions from labor quality, ICT and non-ICT capital deepening and TFP
growth for EU-4 and the U.S. Decompositions are provided for the total economy
(upper panel) and the market sector (lower panel). The results for the total
economy in Table 1 reflect previous findings on comparative EU and U.S. perfor-
mance discussed above. The main source of the EU-4 slowdown is a deceleration
of non-ICT capital deepening and, in contrast to the U.S., a lack of acceleration
of TFP growth. This becomes even more pronounced when focusing on the market
economy (by excluding non-market services). Given the difficulties in measuring
output and productivity in non-market services, this provides a more relevant com-
parison of productivity performance. It appears that TFP growth accelerated par-
ticularly in the business sector in the U.S., but not in the EU. This suggests once
more that a further decomposition of relative TFP performance by industry is
needed to understand divergent growth paths.
Part of the reason for focusing on the aggregate of the four European coun-
tries is to simplify exposition. Obviously, the four EU countries do not form a
single well-integrated economy as the states in the U.S. Therefore it is important
to realize that in some cases the EU-4 aggregate results hide considerable cross-
country variation. Space constraints preclude a full examination of results by
European country but a short description highlighting the main differences is
included below (Section 7).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the data and methods used in constructing our industry growth accounting data-
base, focusing in particular on the derivation of the investment series. It also
describes the method to derive the contributions of industry-level capital deepen-
ing and TFP growth to aggregate labor productivity growth, which is the main
focus of this study. Subsequent sections in turn consider the components that make
up aggregate labor productivity growth: industry-level ICT investment, TFP
growth, labor quality and non-ICT investment. In Section 3 we show that the
industries responsible for ICT capital deepening are the same in the EU and the
U.S. and ICT investment has been growing at a similar pace. However, the con-
tribution to aggregate labor productivity growth is lower in almost all EU indus-
tries due to smaller ICT capital stocks. TFP growth is analyzed in Section 4.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































industries.2 In contrast the contribution of ICT intensive industries, such as trade
and finance, accelerated in the mid-1990s only in the U.S. During 1995–2000,
aggregate TFP growth in the EU still matched that in the U.S. but only because
of higher contributions from industries that are neither ICT producers, nor inten-
sive ICT users. In Section 5 we look at the role of labor quality. Its contribution
in both the EU and the U.S. decreased slightly in the second half of the 1990s but
the industry location varies across the two regions. In Section 6 it is shown that
the deceleration in non-ICT capital deepening in Europe is widespread. Our results
show that nearly every European industry exhibited a deceleration in non-ICT
capital deepening, but about half of the deceleration can be traced to mining and
manufacturing industries. Another quarter is due to slower investment in non-ICT
assets in business services. Comparison of non-ICT capital input levels suggest
that the catch-up potential in Europe has been exhausted. Section 7 discusses per-
formance within the EU-4 and Section 8 provides comparisons of the results of
this study with similar industry decomposition studies for the U.S. and the U.K.
Section 9 concludes.
2. D  M
Data
In this paper we use a database on output and labor and capital inputs for 26
industries in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States, covering the period 1979 to 2000 (GGDC, 2003b). In this section
we give a brief overview of the sources and methods used to construct this data-
base. More detailed information on sources and methods can be found in the
Appendix of this paper and in Inklaar et al. (2003).
Our output measure is value added at constant prices and is based on the
Groningen Growth and Development Centre 60-industry database (GGDC,
2003a). This database is from detailed national accounts as compiled in the OECD
STAN database and from industrial and business surveys.3 Deflators for ICT-
producing manufacturing industries have been harmonized across countries as 
discussed below.
Labor input is measured as hours worked defined as the total number of
persons employed (including self-employed) times the average number of hours
worked. It is taken from the 60-industry database. In addition, for each country
we distinguish between several different types of labor based on educational attain-
ment. To avoid having to force different educational systems into a common clas-
sification, the number of labor types per country varies between three in Germany
and seven in the Netherlands.
To construct our capital input measure we use data on investment in current
and constant prices for six asset types. Of these assets, three refer to ICT goods
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2We find a similar acceleration in TFP growth partly because we use harmonized U.S. ICT defla-
tors in Europe (see Section 2).
3For the most recent version of the 60-industry database as well as detailed descriptions of sources
and methods, see www.ggdc.net.
(computers, communication equipment and software) and three to non-ICT goods
(transport equipment, other (non-ICT) machinery and equipment and non-resi-
dential structures).4 Residential buildings are not taken into account to allow for
a sharper focus on the productivity contribution of business-related assets.5 Since
most of the outputs and inputs of the real estate industry consists of housing and
imputed rents from housing we have to make an adjustment for this. However, it
is hard to separate imputed rents only, so we decided to leave out the real estate
industry from both outputs and inputs. To estimate capital stocks we also need
depreciation rates. For this we rely on industry-specific geometric depreciation
rates for detailed assets. These are based on asset-specific rates in the United States
provided in Fraumeni (1997) and industry shares of these assets from the BEA
NIPA. Rates for ICT equipment are taken from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
These rates are applied to all countries; see Inklaar et al. (2003) for details.
The starting year for our investment data differs by country, beginning as
early as 1901 in the United States and as late as 1970 in Germany. Estimates in
O’Mahony (1999) provide data on capital stocks for long-lived assets such as non-
residential structures up to the year in which the investment data start.
Deflation of ICT Goods
It is well known that the capabilities of semiconductors and computers have
improved tremendously over the past few decades. At present there are only a few
countries, like the U.S., that have an adequate system in place for measuring prices
of computers and semiconductors. This means that measured ICT output and ICT
investment growth in all other countries is likely to be biased downwards. Using
a method that mirrors Schreyer’s (2000, 2002) “harmonization” method we (partly)
avoid this bias. This involves applying U.S. deflators to the ICT-producing manu-
facturing industries in European countries. We apply U.S. double-deflated value
added deflators to each of these industries separately after making a correction
for the difference in the general rate of inflation in the U.S. and the European
country under consideration. In the case of investment deflators, we calculate
(industry-specific) investment goods deflators for computers, communication
equipment and software for the U.S. and apply these to all other countries after
making a correction for the general inflation level.6
Calculating Capital Stocks and Rental Prices
Capital input is measured by capital service flows, following the methodology
pioneered by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and more recently implemented in
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4In the case of the Netherlands, there is currently no data on investment in communication equip-
ment by industry, so estimates were made using information from the other countries.
5We focus on investment in fixed reproducible assets as distinguished in the System of National
Accounts (1993), and hence do not include land, inventories and consumer durables as capital as in
Jorgenson et al. (2005).
6In the case of industry deflators, the general inflation level is measured as the deflator of all indus-
tries except the ICT-producing manufacturing industries. For investment deflators, the inflation level
is defined as the price change of non-ICT investment goods.
Jorgenson et al. (2005). Capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inven-
tory method (PIM):
(1)
where Kj,t is the capital stock of asset j at time t, dj is the (geometric) depreciation
rate of asset j and Ij,t is investment at constant prices. Rental prices for each asset
are given by:
(2)
The rental price of the asset is defined as investment price times the nominal
rate of return R at time t plus the depreciation rate minus the rate of inflation of
the asset in question. We assume the rate of return to be the same across indus-
tries and equal to the internal rate of return for the total economy. Other assump-
tions could be made, such as using an external ex-ante rate or industry-specific
internal rate, but this does not affect our main empirical results (see Appendix).
Growth in capital input is measured by capital service flows as follows:
(3)
where Kj,t is the two-period average share of asset type j in total nominal capital
compensation. For our growth accounts we use ICT capital services, which are 
calculated by weighting each of the ICT capital stocks by the share of the asset
in total ICT capital compensation. Non-ICT capital services are calculated 
analogously.
Growth Accounting and Industry Contributions
To assess the contribution of the various inputs to aggregate growth, a growth
accounting framework is followed as developed by Jorgenson and associates and
used in, for example, Jorgenson et al. (2005). For each industry, gross value added
(Y ) is produced from an aggregate input X, consisting of ICT capital services
(KICT ), non-ICT capital services (KN) and labor services (L).7 Productivity is rep-
resented as a Hicks-neutral augmentation of aggregate input (A). The industry
production function (industry and time subscripts are omitted) takes the follow-
ing form:
(4)
with superscript N indicating services from non-ICT capital and superscript ICT
indicating services from ICT capital. Under the assumption of competitive factor
markets, full input utilization and constant returns to scale, the growth of output
can be expressed as the (compensation share) weighted growth of inputs and total
factor productivity, denoted by A, which is derived as a residual.
(5) D D D D Dln ln ln ln lnY v L v K v K AL N N ICT ICT= + + +
Y AX L K KN ICT= ( ), ,
v
D Dln ln, ,K v Kt j tK
j
j t= Â
r R p pj t t j j t j t, , ,˙= + -( )d
K K Ij t j j t j t, , , ,= -( ) +-1 1d
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7In this database we do not allow for a separate role for intermediate inputs, as the required
input/output tables to do so are not yet available for all countries. This means our TFP measure is
based on value added instead of gross output.
where i denotes the two-period average share of input i in total factor income.
Imposing constant returns to scale implies L + N + ICT = 1. Capital services
are defined in (3) as a compensation share weighted aggregate of capital stocks.
As in Jorgenson et al. (2005), we define labor quality growth (D lnqL) as the
difference between the growth of labor input and the growth of total hours
worked:
(6)
where L is the labor input index, aggregated over the h labor types using labor
compensation shares and Ht is total hours worked, summed over the different labor
types.
By rearranging equation (5) the results can be presented in terms of average
labor productivity growth defined as the ratio of output to hours worked, y = Y/H,
the ratio of capital services to hours worked, k = K/H, labor quality and TFP as
follows:
(7)
In this paper we focus on the contribution of industry input growth and TFP
growth to aggregate labor productivity growth. As shown by Stiroh (2002b), aggre-
gate labor productivity growth can be decomposed into industry contributions as
follows:
(8)
where iY is the two-period average share of industry i in aggregate value added.
The term in brackets in equation (8) is the reallocation of hours and reflects 
differences in the share of an industry in aggregate value added and its share in
aggregate hours worked. This term will be positive when industries with an 
above-average labor productivity level show positive employment growth or when
industries with below average labor productivity have declining employment
shares.
Combining the decomposition of industry labor productivity in (7) with equa-
tion (8), the full decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth can be
written as:
(9)
In this way, the contribution of input and TFP growth from each industry to
aggregate labor productivity growth can be calculated. For example, the contri-
bution of ICT-capital deepening in industry i to aggregate labor productivity
growth is given by:
(10)
which is the growth of ICT capital per hour worked in industry i weighted by the
share of ICT capital compensation in industry i in aggregate nominal value added.
The weight is the product of the share of industry i in aggregate value added 
LPCON v v kiICT iY iICT iICT= ( )D ln
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( iY) and the share of ICT capital compensation in industry value added ( iICT ).
Similar calculations are carried out for the contributions of non-ICT capital, labor
quality and TFP.8
Aggregation
There are a number of ways to aggregate output and inputs across industries.
Each of these methods corresponds to different assumptions regarding relative
price movements of output and inputs across industries. Jorgenson et al. (2005)
distinguish three methods, namely the aggregate production function, the aggre-
gate production possibility frontier and aggregation over industries. In this paper
we employ the third method, which requires the weakest assumptions regarding
equality of prices of value added and inputs across industries. This means that we
weight industry growth rates of output and inputs by their share in aggregate value
added to calculate the contributions as in Table 1 and subsequent tables.
Also we calculate an aggregate of the four European countries, which we refer
to as EU-4. Since output prices of each industry generally differ across countries
we use industry-specific output purchasing power parities (O-PPPs) to aggregate
value added at current prices across the EU-4 in a single deflation procedure. These
output PPPs are also used to aggregate labor and capital compensation. In theory,
we would like to have used specific intermediate input, labor and capital service
PPPs, but consistent estimates of input and output PPPs are not yet available.9
Growth of output and inputs are then aggregated across countries in a similar
manner as aggregation across industries.
Industry Groupings
Previous studies on U.S.–EU labor productivity growth differences suggested
that the key to understanding the acceleration in U.S. labor productivity growth
and the lack of it in the EU is the difference in performance of industries that
intensively use ICT and those that do not (van Ark et al., 2003). In this paper,
forming groups of industries is not necessary for analytical purposes, since we have
ICT investment data for each of our industries. Such grouping does, however, ease
exposition quite substantially, so we adopt it here as well (see Appendix Table A1
for an overview of the classification used in this paper). In each of our tables we
not only show the total contribution of each industry group, but also the contri-
butions from the most important industries in that group. This brings some of the
results in clearer perspective, but can also be used to test the robustness of our
conclusions to the exact industry grouping. Due to their size, we show mainly ser-
vices industries, while consolidating manufacturing industries. Those interested in
vv
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8For a more extensive description of methodology, see Inklaar et al. (2003).
9See Inklaar et al. (2003) for a description of the construction of these PPPs. Although the theo-
retical case for using specific PPPs for the various inputs is not in dispute, the main problem is the
practical implementation. If PPPs for inputs and outputs diverge, the inputs are not likely to add up
to output converted using output PPPs. The choice of PPPs is not crucial to our results however. Some
experiments using the same PPP across all inputs and industries did not lead to significantly different
results for the EU-4.
individual manufacturing industries and other consolidated industries are referred
to Inklaar et al. (2003).
3. ICT C S G
In Tables 2–4, we analyze the growing importance of ICT capital and its con-
tribution to aggregate labor productivity growth based on equation (10). But its
component parts also convey interesting information about the changing role of
ICT in economic growth. In Table 2 we show the industry contributions to aggre-
gate ICT capital deepening (using industry shares in ICT compensation as weights)
to single out the most important ICT-using industries. In Table 3 the share of ICT
capital compensation in industry value added is given ( iICT) to indicate differences
in importance of ICT in various industries. In Table 4 we bring together the results
in the previous two tables to show the contribution of growth in ICT capital in
industry i to aggregate labor productivity growth (LPCONiICT).
Looking at Table 2, it is striking to see that the figures for the EU-4 and U.S.
do not differ by much: ICT capital deepening has been progressing at double-digit
growth rates since 1979 in both regions. Although growth has been faster in the
U.S., the differences are relatively minor. This picture extends quite well to each
of the industry groups, but at the industry level, notable differences start to appear.
Within ICT-producing industries, the U.S. clearly leads in terms of ICT invest-
ment growth in manufacturing industries, while ICT investment in the telecom-
munication services industry grows much faster in the EU-4 in both periods. In
ICT-using industries, both the wholesale and retail trade sectors in the U.S. clearly
invested at a faster pace in ICT assets between 1979 and 1995 but subsequently
the EU-4 had mostly closed this growth gap. In business services, on the other
hand, the EU-4 showed considerably stronger investment growth in both periods
than the U.S. In non-ICT industries, the most noticeable difference between the
two regions is faster EU-4 ICT investment growth in non-ICT manufacturing
between 1979 and 1995.
The fact that ICT capital service growth is roughly similar in the EU-4 and
the U.S. does not contradict our earlier finding in Table 1 that ICT capital deep-
ening makes a much larger contribution to aggregate labor productivity growth in
the U.S. than the EU-4. The larger contribution is due to the fact that ICT capital
compensation makes up a much larger share of value added in the United States
than in the EU-4 as shown in Table 3. This mirrors the finding of others (Oulton,
2001; Colecchia and Schreyer, 2002; Timmer and van Ark, 2005). The higher share
is due to the fact that the levels of ICT-investment in the EU have been much lower
than in the U.S. in the period under consideration, although growth rates are com-
parable. Consequently, the absolute gap in ICT-capital intensity is increasing
steadily. Table 3 shows that this is true for all industry groups.
Between 1979 and 1995, ICT capital made up only 2.5 percent of aggregate
value added in the EU-4 but 3.4 percent in the United States. For the 1995–2000
period, the gap had grown to nearly two percentage points. This gap can be found
in all of the industry groups and is biggest in ICT-producing industries. When
comparing the two periods, the ICT share in the ICT-using industries stands out















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the ICT share in value added was relatively close, but by 2000, the gap had grown
to the point where ICT capital made up more than 7.5 percent of value added in
U.S. ICT-using industries, while it remained below 6 percent in the EU-4. At the
industry level, some of the differences that stood out in Table 2 can be seen in
Table 3 as well. The ICT share in ICT-producing manufacturing industries, as well
as the finance and trade sectors is considerably higher in the U.S. than in the EU-
4. In fact, with the exception of business services, all industries have a higher ICT
share in the U.S. This even holds for industries such as telecommunications where
the growth of ICT capital services was higher in the EU-4. Nevertheless there is a
noticeable similarity in the cross-section pattern of ICT shares in the two regions
as shown in Figure 1, which sorts industries according to U.S. ICT shares. With
the exception of oil refining, all industries that are near the top of the distribution
in the U.S., are also near the top in the EU-4.
Using ICT capital deepening by industry from Table 2 and the shares in 
Table 3, one can arrive at the contribution of ICT capital deepening in each 
industry to aggregate labor productivity growth (equation (10)). The results are
shown in Table 4. The first row shows the contribution to aggregate labor 
productivity growth of ICT capital deepening in all industries, reproduced from
Table 1. Subsequent rows decompose the contributions given in the first row by
industry. So, for example, the entry 0.35 for ICT-using industries in the EU-4 
for the 1995–2000 period indicates that ICT-capital deepening in the ICT-using
industries in the EU-4 contributed 0.35 percentage points to aggregate labor 
productivity growth in this period. In contrast, ICT capital deepening in 
ICT-producing industries only contributed 0.07 percentage points.
This table makes clear that ICT-using industries are responsible for the largest
part of the difference in the aggregate contribution of ICT capital to labor pro-
ductivity growth between the EU-4 and the United States (0.22 percentage points
out of 0.33 percentage points). It is also the industry group where the difference
has grown most in the late 1990s (0.15 percentage points). This table shows how
only a few industries are responsible for the acceleration. In the U.S., nearly half
of the aggregate acceleration can be traced to financial intermediation (0.17 per-
centage points out of 0.40). Together with wholesale trade and business services,
this rises to 0.27 percentage points. In the EU-4 these same industries are also
responsible for most of the acceleration, but in absolute terms both the contribu-
tions and the accelerations are much smaller than in the United States. Outside
the ICT-using industries, the contributions are much lower. In the case of ICT-
producing industries this is mostly related to their smaller size. In non-ICT indus-
tries, however, it is clear that the low level of ICT investment diminishes their
contributions. A ranking of the contributions from ICT capital deepening for all
industries for the 1995–2000 period in Figure 2 shows similar distributions in the
U.S. and the EU-4 but also indicates the overwhelming impact of the finance sector
on the overall difference in contribution between both regions.
4. TFP G
Although the differences in ICT investment are quite important for explain-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































substantial role to play as shown in Table 1. While aggregate TFP growth in the
EU-4 increased only slightly after 1995, U.S. growth accelerated strongly. Which
industries were responsible for this acceleration? The contribution to aggregate
labor productivity growth, and hence to aggregate TFP growth, can be calculated
as the growth of TFP in industry i weighted by the share of industry i in aggre-
gate value added. The results are given in Table 5 and should be interpreted anal-
ogously to the results in Table 4. The first row shows the contribution to aggregate
labor productivity of TFP growth, from Table 1, aggregated over all industries.
In contrast to the extent of ICT investment, the industry pattern of TFP per-
formance is much more heterogeneous. ICT-producing industries make the largest
contribution to TFP growth in both the EU-4 and U.S. In the U.S. most of the
contribution can be traced to ICT-producing manufacturing while in the EU-4
communications services play a much more important role. After 1995, ICT-
producing industries still make the largest contribution to overall U.S. TFP
growth, but the contribution of ICT-using industries is almost as large. The accel-
eration in the TFP contribution of ICT-using industries in the U.S. is mostly
related to accelerations in three industries: wholesale trade, retail trade and finan-
cial intermediation. The U.S. findings broadly confirm those of Jorgenson et al.
(2005) and Triplett and Bosworth (2004) (see also Section 8).
In contrast, in the EU-4 none of these industries is an important contributor
to aggregate TFP growth. The only reason that aggregate TFP in the EU-4 is still
on par with the U.S. is due to the much higher contribution from TFP growth in
non-ICT industries. During the 1995–2000 period it added 0.35 percentage points
to aggregate labor productivity growth in the EU-4, but it contributed negatively
in the U.S. This mainly involved contributions from transport and storage, non-
market services and other non-ICT industries. In contrast, in the U.S. the contri-
butions from non-ICT sectors were small or even negative. These were largely
driven by the substantial negative values in non-market services. But there is a large
question mark regarding the reliability of output measurement in these sectors and
it is unclear whether these differences between the U.S and Europe are due to dif-
ferences in output measurement methodologies or reflect underlying differences in
performance.10
Figure 3 shows TFP contributions of all industries for the 1995–2000 period
for the EU-4 and U.S. While Figures 2 and 3 showed considerable similarities, TFP
performance is much more heterogeneous. This is noticeable in industries such as
telecommunications, transport services and utilities, where EU-4 contributions are
much higher than in the U.S., as well as wholesale trade and retail trade, where
the U.S. industries are near the top of the distribution.
5. L Q G
Differences in labor quality growth are relatively unimportant in terms of
explaining the aggregate labor productivity growth differential between the EU-4
and the U.S. However, the results at the industry level do point to some noticeable
521

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































differences between the two regions. The contribution to aggregate labor produc-
tivity growth can be calculated as the growth of labor quality in industry i weighted
by the share of labor compensation in industry i in aggregate nominal value added.
The results are given in Table 6 and should be interpreted analogously to the results
in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 6 shows that after 1995 the contribution of labor quality growth to
aggregate labor productivity growth slowed down in both the EU-4 and the U.S.
Throughout the period the EU-4 had a somewhat higher contribution, but the
contributions were generally close. This table shows that between 1979 and 1995,
non-ICT manufacturing in the EU-4 shows particularly large contributions.
These are sectors that intensively use craft level skills, a traditional area of focus
of European upskilling. Together with the larger contribution from non-market
services, these larger contributions more than account for the aggregate differen-
tial. After 1995 the differential in these industries between the EU-4 and U.S.
mostly disappeared, largely due to a large drop in labor quality contributions in
non-ICT manufacturing in the EU-4.
In the U.S. on the other hand, the labor quality contribution of finance and
business services was noticeably higher than in the EU-4. These industries inten-
sively use university graduates, which has long been an area of strength of the U.S.
skill acquisition system. In business services, this position was reversed after 1995
with the EU-4 showing a larger contribution. In terms of labor quality contribu-
tions, in the period 1995–2000 the EU-4 converged on the U.S. in ICT-producing
and ICT-using industries. Furthermore, the earlier lead of the U.S. in these indus-
tries points to possible ICT–skill complementarities. However, the issue of factor
complementarities cannot be handled in a growth accounting framework and
needs factor demand analysis such as in Chun (2003).
6. N-ICT C S G
Differences in ICT capital deepening and TFP growth by industry appeared
to be important in explaining the aggregate labor productivity divergence between
the EU-4 and the U.S. They explain well why Europe is lagging behind the U.S.
in the period 1995–2000, but they do not provide an explanation why Europe’s
labor productivity growth slowed down so much compared to the previous period.
As discussed in the previous section, this deceleration also can only be marginally
explained by trends in labor quality growth. Therefore we now turn to investment
trends in non-ICT assets. As Table 1 shows, EU-4 non-ICT capital deepening
decelerated sharply after 1995. Due to the relatively large share of non-ICT capital
in total capital this is a major factor in explaining the deceleration of labor 
productivity growth.
The contribution of non-ICT capital deepening in industry i to aggregate
labor productivity growth can be calculated as the growth of non-ICT capital per
hour worked in industry i weighted by the share of capital compensation in indus-
try i in aggregate nominal value added. The results are given in Table 7 and should
be interpreted analogously to the results in previous tables. The first row shows
the contribution to aggregate labor productivity growth by non-ICT capital deep-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































capital deepening” in Table 1. Subsequent rows decompose the contributions given
in the first row by industry group.
The striking finding in Table 7 is that the deceleration in the EU-4 has been
very widespread as almost all industries show declines in non-ICT capital deep-
ening contributions after 1995.11 A number of industries stand out. First of all,
manufacturing (ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-ICT manufacturing) is
responsible for around one-third of the aggregate deceleration, which is much
bigger than its share in GDP. More than a quarter of the aggregate deceleration
can be traced to business services where non-ICT capital per hour worked was
actually declining after 1995. Finally, mining makes up another 20 percent of the
deceleration. This industry showed a similar decline in contribution in the U.S.
In focusing on the slowdown in non-ICT capital deepening in the EU-4 we
should not lose sight of the fact that before 1995, non-ICT capital deepening pro-
gressed at a much faster pace than in the U.S. in almost all industries, except some
ICT-using industries. After 1995 the contributions in the EU-4 and U.S., in par-
ticular from the non-ICT industries, are more similar. This becomes especially
clear in Figure 4, which ranks the contributions to aggregate labor productivity
from non-ICT capital deepening for the 1995–2000 period. While the ranking of
industries differs in some cases, contributions in many industries are remarkably
close. One interpretation of the decline in contributions after 1995 is that the pos-
sibilities for European catch-up were mostly exhausted by 1995 and that growth
slowed down to a pace more comparable to the productivity leader.
To investigate this hypothesis, relative levels of output and inputs would be
required. These are provided in Table 8. Levels of ICT and non-ICT capital input
per hour worked are shown for the EU-4 and the U.S., for both the total economy
and the three industry groups. It follows that in 1999, the EU-4 has indeed taken
over the U.S. in levels of non-ICT capital intensity by almost 20 percent. This has
generally been attributed to higher wages in Europe relative to the U.S., leading
to a deeper substitution process of capital for labor. This process has stopped.
However, for ICT capital, sizeable gaps exist. In 1999, ICT capital service input in
the EU-4 was barely 50 percent of the U.S. level. This suggests that catch-up poten-
tial for Europe in non-ICT capital has already been exhausted, but that a new gap
has opened in ICT capital input.
7. R W E
The main reason for comparing the EU-4 and the U.S. is that many of the
observations about comparative EU-4 growth hold for each of the four individ-
ual countries as well. In Figure 5 we show the decomposition of aggregate labor
productivity growth for the individual European countries as well as the EU-4 and
U.S. First, the European countries all had higher labor productivity growth than
the U.S. before 1995 and all except the U.K. had lower growth after 1995. Fur-
thermore, the contribution of ICT capital deepening is lower than in the U.S. in
all European countries throughout the period but all four show accelerations in
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their ICT capital contributions. In addition all four show decelerations in contri-
butions of non-ICT capital deepening. The magnitudes of these common trends
do however vary across countries. Finally the time pattern of TFP growth shows
more variation, with accelerations in the U.K. and Germany and decelerations in
France and the Netherlands.
As argued above, in contrast to the U.S. intensive ICT users have not gener-
ated faster TFP growth in the EU-4. In the individual European countries, there
are some exceptions to this pattern. Notably, TFP growth in U.K. retail trade, and
wholesale trade in the Netherlands accelerated notably after 1995. It is beyond the
scope of the paper to discuss the individual country results in more detail; the
interested reader is referred to Inklaar et al. (2003).
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TABLE 8
L  ICT  N-ICT C I P H W  U.S. D  1999
ICT Capital Non-ICT Capital
EU-4 EU-4
EU-4 U.S. (U.S. = 100) EU-4 U.S. (U.S. = 100)
Total economy 0.88 1.68 52.4 8.70 7.37 118.1
ICT producing industries 3.51 7.36 47.7 12.55 11.67 107.5
ICT using industries 1.31 2.72 48.1 7.84 7.28 107.8
Non-ICT industies 0.44 0.67 66.2 8.73 7.15 122.2
Note: Capital compensation per hour worked converted to U.S. dollars using capital service PPPs,
see Appendix.













Labour quality Reallocation of hours ICT capital deepening Non-ICT capital deepening TFP growth
Figure 5. Sources of Labour Productivity Growth in Europe and the United States, 1979–2000
Source: See Section 2 and Appendix.
530
8. C  O I S
Industry level growth-accounting decompositions of aggregate labor produc-
tivity trends are still few. The main ones include Jorgenson et al. (2005) and Triplett
and Bosworth (2004) for the U.S., and Basu et al. (2003), which compares the U.S.
with the U.K. The findings for the U.S. in this paper are broadly consistent with
the findings of the other studies. However, estimates sometimes differ greatly at
the detailed industry level, for example about the relative importance of the TFP
growth acceleration in ICT-goods manufacturing versus ICT-using industries. In
Triplett and Bosworth (2004, Tables 2–6) the contribution of services to TFP
growth acceleration is much bigger than in Jorgenson et al. (2005, Figure 26). And
while Jorgenson et al. (2005) show an acceleration in TFP growth in retail trade
and a deceleration in wholesale trade, Triplett and Bosworth (2004) find an accel-
eration in both. Our estimates, and those of Basu et al. (2003), are much closer to
those of Triplett and Bosworth (2004) than to Jorgenson et al. (2005).
The different findings are due to many differences both in data sources and
methodology. We mention three important ones. First, our analysis is based on
value added measures and therefore does not take into account the role of inter-
mediate inputs as the U.S. studies do. This will affect TFP growth estimates, but
much less so measures of TFP acceleration or deceleration, which are the main
focus here. Second, the capital concept of Jorgenson et al. (2005) is broader than
in the other studies by including inventories, land and consumer durables. Third,
the data used in this study is benchmarked on industry accounts from the BEA
NIPA for output, labor input and investment flows. Triplett and Bosworth (2004)
use a hybrid database by combining BEA industry accounts with capital service
flows from the BLS.12 Basu et al. (2003) use a similar database as Triplett and
Bosworth (2004).13 Jorgenson et al. (2005) on the other hand combine BLS inter-
industry accounts with investment flows from the BEA and they benchmark labor
input on BEA NIPA hours. BLS and BEA datasets show important differences in
some industries, even for relatively simple measures such as gross output and value
added at current prices. Triplett and Bosworth (2004) provide a discussion of these
differences and their possible origins but they conclude that many questions still
remain.
An important difference between the dataset of Basu et al. (2003) and our
data for the U.K. comes from the estimates for aggregate software investment.
Both estimates scale up software from the national accounts as this is widely
regarded as an underestimate, since it is not consistent with survey based evidence.
But the adjustment in this paper is smaller. As a result, our estimates of the share
of ICT capital in value added come out lower than the estimates of Basu et al.
Whereas both this paper and Basu et al. (2003) find TFP acceleration in finance
and wholesale trade, this paper also finds a small increase in other ICT-using
sectors. Further research is needed to reconcile these findings.
12In contrast to the other studies, they do not correct labor input for hours worked, nor for quality
changes.
13Except for labor input where they use estimates of hours worked by industry from the BLS
instead of persons engaged in production from the BEA.
9. C R
This paper began by raising the question why U.S. productivity growth accel-
erated after 1995, while growth in four major EU countries (France, Germany,
Netherlands and the U.K.) decelerated. Much of the growth accounting literature
in recent years has been dominated by trends in the U.S. and so has focused largely
on the impact of ICT on output growth. This new technology focus has also dom-
inated the analysis of productivity growth for other industrial countries. But by
doing so, there is a danger that research ignores the possibility that the stylized
facts on output and productivity growth in other nations may be different from
those in the U.S. Indeed, as was shown in earlier work that focused on aggregate
trends, the sources of U.S. acceleration and EU slowdown are very different
(Timmer and van Ark, 2005). In this paper we have added detail to this difference
by analyzing productivity growth at the industry-level. It appears that aggregate
trends conceal much heterogeneity among the industries.
To understand the U.S. acceleration it is important to focus on services indus-
tries that use ICT intensively. These industries, mainly trade and finance, are
responsible for most of the acceleration in ICT capital deepening and TFP growth
alike. Together with faster technical progress in ICT-producing industries, they
explain most of the acceleration in U.S. labor productivity growth after 1995.
In contrast, in the EU-4 the contributions from ICT capital deepening and
TFP growth are much lower than in the U.S. It is true that the same industries 
as in the U.S. make the largest contribution to ICT capital deepening, but the
absolute contributions are much lower due to lower levels of ICT capital stocks.
Furthermore, these intensive ICT users have not generated faster TFP growth and
instead, EU-4 TFP growth remained mostly confined to industries that produce
ICT goods and services. This raises important questions on the extent to which
these European countries are merely lagging the U.S., given the latter country’s
faster adoption of ICT, or whether there are institutional constraints that prevent
EU countries from realizing the full benefits from ICT.
This paper also shows that ICT is not the dominant explanation of the slow-
down in labor productivity growth, at least in the four large EU countries studied.
To explain the slowdown in the European countries we need to look at non-ICT
capital deepening, whose contribution slowed down in most of the EU-4 indus-
tries, with the largest declines occurring in manufacturing, business services and
mining. The pervasive nature of this slowdown suggests economy-wide factors
may be important. We found that catch-up potential in non-ICT capital has been
exhausted by the end of the 1990s in almost all industries.
There are also other important analytical issues that cannot be easily under-
stood in a simple growth accounting framework. These include possible spillovers
of ICT to TFP growth, complementarities between ICT and skills and the impor-
tance of investment in intangibles such as organizational capital.14 So far the 
evidence available on these issues has focused almost solely on the U.S. However,
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14See, for example, Stiroh (2002a) and O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) for some evidence on the pos-
sibility of ICT spillovers, Chun (2003) for evidence on ICT-skill complementarities, Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2000) for the importance of organizational capital and Basu et al. (2003) for a discussion of com-
plementary capital and consequences for lagged TFP responses.
the dataset used in this paper and the stylized facts that were presented should
allow more and better research into these issues for Europe.
A: D S  M D
The full set of data underlying the results presented above can be downloaded
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre website (http://
www.ggdc.net). In this appendix we provide more information about the sources
we used to estimate our investment and labor quality series. We also provide
further discussion on some of the intricate methodological choices we made
regarding software investment, the rate of return and the PPPs used to aggregate
output and inputs across European countries.
Labor Quality
Information on the share of each labor type in total employment and their
shares in total labor compensation is drawn from national labor force surveys. For
the U.K. this was the Labor Force Survey for numbers employed throughout and
for wages by skill type from 1993. Prior to this information on wages were taken
from the General Household Survey. U.S. data were taken from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey. Data for the Netherlands are only available from 1990 onwards
and are based on annual data from the Labor Force Survey and wage surveys for
1995, 1997 and 1998. Due to small samples for some industries, we can only dis-
tinguish ten sectors. Employment and labor compensation shares for detailed
industries are assumed equal to the higher aggregates. Data for France were based
on estimates by INSEE, supplied by CEPII, and for Germany were based on data
from the German Employment Statistics and Wage and Salary Statistics produced
by the Statistiches Bundesamt. Details of the skill categories for each country are
given in O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003, Chapter VII, p. 243).
We apply the employment shares by type to the total number of hours worked
from the GGDC 60-industry database and the compensation shares to total labor
compensation. The 60-industry database contains information on labor compen-
sation of employees, which includes wages and salaries as well as supplements such
as social security payments. Labor compensation of self-employed is part of the
operating surplus, so we have to make an estimate to back it out. Based on evidence
for the U.S. from Jorgenson et al. (2005), we put the average wages of self-employed
at 70 percent of employee wages for each country, industry and year. Although this
is a simplification, we currently lack the data to make more detailed estimates.
Investment by Industry and Asset Type
In the case of France, the Netherlands and the U.S., the investment data are
based on detailed files from the national statistical offices, which are not published
as part of the regular national accounts. However, the data are consistent with total
investment by industry and total investment by asset from the national accounts.
In the case of the Netherlands the industry classification maps onto our industry
set in a straightforward way, as does the asset classification (with the exception of
communication equipment). For France and the U.S., the industry classification
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differs considerably in some cases. In France the classification of manufacturing
industries is quite different from the one we adopt in this paper, while in the U.S.
the main problems occur with retail trade (which includes restaurants under the
U.S. SIC87 classification), the computer industry (included with machinery) and
cable television services (included with television broadcasting). For both France
and the U.S., we use detailed investment data from industrial surveys to reallocate
investment of manufacturing industries. For reallocations of service industries in
the U.S., we use capital flow tables for 1982 and 1992.15 In making these realloca-
tions, we assume the asset composition is the same for each part of the industry.
Aggregation across assets and industries takes place by summing current invest-
ment and T rnqvist aggregating investment at constant prices.
In the case of Germany and the U.K., derivation of detailed industry-level
investment series required the use of data from secondary sources such as
input–output investment flow matrices and dedicated investment surveys. For the
U.K. the main problem is estimating investment in ICT assets by industry, as
investment in transport equipment, structures and plant and equipment is readily
available. Shares of industries in aggregate investment in ICT goods are derived
using capital flow tables from Supply-Use Tables from 1992 and periodic input
output tables before then, interpolating for missing years. Economy wide series for
ICT investment are based on Oulton (2001), except that the benchmark level of
software investment in 1998 is derived using data on software sales from the Com-
puter Services Survey by ONS, excluding consulting and software maintenance.
Net exports were then subtracted using data from United Kingdom Balance of Pay-
ments, 2000 Edition (ONS, 2001). Finally an allowance was made for consumer
expenditure on software from Family Spending: A Report on the 1999–2000 Family
Expenditure Survey (ONS, 2001) (see also the discussion on software below).
German investment data by industry is only available from 1991 onwards. We
extrapolate these figures using data for West Germany for the period 1970–91. In
the German National Accounts, only investment in structures is distinguished
from investment in other assets. We use data from the Ifo Investitionenrechnung to
estimate industry shares of aggregate investment in computers and communica-
tion equipment, scaled up to include software using industry scaling factors for
other countries combined with aggregate data from the national accounts. After
applying the industry shares to aggregate investment, investment in non-IT equip-
ment is calculated as a residual.
One important problem in estimating ICT investment is differences across
countries in how software investment is measured. A major problem is the mea-
surement of own-account software, since these products are not sold on the market,
but instead produced and used within businesses. Another problem is which part
of computer services is classified as investment and which part is considered inter-
mediate use. As Ahmad (2003) shows, there are important differences across coun-
tries in statistical practices. One indicator of the severity of the problems is the
software-to-hardware investment ratio. It is not likely that this differs highly
between countries. Based on official figures, this ratio is particularly low in the U.K.
˙˙o
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15At the time of analysis, the 1997 U.S. capital flow table had not yet been released, so these esti-
mates are not incorporated in our results.
compared to the other countries, as noted also by Oulton (2001). We therefore made
an upward adjustment to the software investment figures for the U.K., as detailed
above, without claiming that all comparability issues have been resolved. This
remains an important area for further research and data development.
Rate of Return
As discussed in the main text, we use the aggregate internal rate of return in
our rental price calculations. The internal rate of return is the rate at which capital
compensation equates total operating surplus, in effect imposing constant returns
to scale. We applied the aggregate return to all industries, mainly because indus-
try-level estimates of internal rates of return are highly volatile and can become
persistently negative. We could also have applied an external rate of return, such
as government bond yields or corporate yields. Although these choices have impor-
tant theoretical implications, our empirical results are not sensitive to the specific
choice we made. Experiments suggest that total capital services growth would
change by about 0.1–0.2 percentage point per year if an external rate of return
would have been used instead of the aggregate internal rate, which translates into
a maximum change of around 0.05 percentage point in TFP growth rates.
Industry Classification
Table A1 gives the classification of our 26 industries into IT-producing, ICT-
using and non-ICT. First, ICT-producing industries are identified using a classifi-
cation from the OECD (2002b), which identifies manufacturing and services
industries that supply ICT goods and services. However, this classification identi-
fies more detailed industries than we can distinguish in our dataset, so some com-
promises have to be made. Most importantly, we do not separately distinguish the
computer services industry (ISIC 72), which is part of business services.
To distinguish ICT-using industries, we rely on the classification from van Ark
et al. (2003). In that paper, industries are classified as ICT-using if the ICT share
in U.S. capital compensation in 1995 is higher than the median. This classification
also distinguishes more detailed industries than we have in our dataset, so we clas-
sify our industries as ICT-using if the majority of its output is classified as ICT-
using in van Ark et al. (2003). As discussed in the main text, this grouping of
industries mainly serves to present and discuss our results in an accessible way.
Comparing Capital Service Levels
The current value of capital compensation for each capital asset in European
countries in converted to U.S. dollars using investment PPPs corrected for differ-
ences in annualization factors. The price of capital services is the rental price as
shown in equation (A1). For comparisons across countries, we need an estimate
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Equation (A1) gives an expression for the rental price of asset j in countries
k and m (since we use the same depreciation rate across countries, no country sub-
script is attached). Most elements of equation (A1) are readily available, since we
could already calculate the rental price from equation (2). The only missing
element is the investment PPP (PPPI). For this, we rely on OECD (2002a) expen-
diture PPPs for 35 assets for 1999. The 35 assets are aggregated to the six assets
in this study using a multilateral (EKS) aggregation procedure. The resulting
capital service PPPs are used to convert capital compensation to U.S. dollars. EU-
4 ICT (non-ICT) capital compensation in U.S. dollars is the sum of ICT (non-
ICT) capital compensation of the four European countries.
R
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